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# Report 1: Research agendas supporting the development of Cultural and Creative Industries (CCIs)

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*The brief: 'Conduct an analysis and provide a written overview on current research trends within CCI globally and possible avenues for a new Research Center for CCI in Iceland taking into account as much as the possible Icelandic context.'*

## Introduction

There are some underlying conceptual and strategic matters that influence all research on the CCIs. We start with two of these matters:

### **1. Understand, explore and interrogate the conceptual underpinnings of cultural and creative industries**

At a conceptual level, it is important to understand the origins of creative industries as an initiative of policy and industry actors rather than as an academic subdiscipline or field. It orients us to the need to build research agendas that are fully conversant and engaged with policy and industry interests and issues.

### **2. The 'triple bottom line'. Economic, cultural and social approaches to the CCIs: separate or convergent?**

This section reviews one of the central issues for CCIs research: what are the relations between the economic, cultural and social dimensions of the CCIs, and how these relations might be managed as we develop research agendas. We hope to have shown in various ways in both this Report 1 and Report 2 that there doesn't have to be either/or choices that exclude other dimensions.

### **3. General Global Overview of CCIs Research Trends and Priority Topics**

This section overviews the main themes arising from global creative industries academic research.

### **4. Outside the big cities: Rural CCIs and opportunities for innovation**

This section reviews literature and also draws on our recent research on regional/rural hotspots in Australia and the issues it raised.

### **5. Creative activity as a 'vocation' and measurable cultural activity**

This section examines Cultural Indicators and Creative Vocations. With these we wanted to a) give a sense of breadth/blue sky of the possible research agendas (in light of the views expressed in the

Iceland stakeholder discussions), and b) demonstrate that the economic goals of CCI research are fully complementary with other research interests and policy agendas.

There are, of course, innumerable other research issues in the CCIs. Individual sectors/sub-sectors are the subject of voluminous research. For some sectors, issues of IP capture and commercial exploitation pose increasing challenges. Education and training for the CCIs remains a critical researchable priority, given that research and education should go hand in hand in universities. And the matter of definitions, categories and measurement remain fundamental. What cannot be measured cannot be responded to in modern policy processes.

That is the subject of our second report.

**Note: parts of this report are sourced from**

Stuart Cunningham and Terry Flew (2019), Introduction to A Research Agenda for Creative Industries', in Stuart Cunningham and Terry Flew (eds) 2019, *A Research Agenda for Creative Industries*, Edward Elgar, pp. 1-20

Terry Flew (2019), Creative Industries between Cultural Economics and Cultural Studies, in Stuart Cunningham and Terry Flew (eds) 2019, *A Research Agenda for Creative Industries*, Edward Elgar, pp. 58-75

Stuart Cunningham and Marion McCutcheon (2020), Submission to Parliamentary Inquiry into Australia's Creative and Cultural Industries and Institutions. Submission #45. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. Published online

[https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\\_Business/Committees/House/Communications/Arts](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Communications/Arts), and

Scott Brook (2020), Submission to Parliamentary Inquiry into Australia's Creative and Cultural Industries and Institutions. Submission #301. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. Published online [https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\\_Business/Committees/House/Communications/Arts](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Communications/Arts)

## 1. Understand, explore and interrogate the conceptual underpinnings of cultural and creative industries.

A research agenda for CCIs should be outward-looking beyond academic disciplinary boundaries, shaped by its relevance to policy, industry, culture and society.

There is ongoing academic debate and the evident need for greater uniformity in the area of official statistics (see Report 2). But it is important to stress widespread consensus building going on that has led to the phrase *cultural and creative industries* gaining ever wider global acceptance. It is important that this foundational work is done in Iceland so that it is embedded in the polity and culture of Iceland.

The creative industries concept was developed as a joint industry-policy initiative by the UK government in the late 1990s. Scholarly attention to and criticism of it is a function of its existence as a hybrid assemblage of industry activity, human creativity, research work, state policies and programs, and curriculum, pedagogy and training. In numerous parts of the world, a research agenda for creative industries is now inextricably tied to the concept's deployment in policy, programs, and education.

Academic disciplinary knowledge is typically generated by the successive refining of methods of enquiry and the stabilisation of objects of enquiry. But industry and policy development processes are very different. Looking back at the 'birth' of creative industries, one of its principal architects, John Newbigin (2019), reminds us of the politically experimental, contingent nature of the 'uncharted territory' of 'raising the profile of an eclectic jumble of generally IP-based, culturally-rooted businesses that governments and banks had conspicuously failed to understand or take seriously as part of the economy'. Lutz and Karra (2009, p. 117) argued that DCMS' definition 'does not provide any systematic, persuasive or logical explanation of what precisely its clump of thirteen subsectors (advertising, architecture, art and antiques, crafts, design, designer fashion, software, film and video, music, performing arts, publishing, television and radio) share'.

Emphasising these contingent beginnings is by no means to say that rigorous disciplinary knowledge cannot, or should not, be brought to bear in creative industries research. Indeed, the opposite is certainly the case. It also does not mean that there are not increasing constants that researchers can identify as distinctly constituting the field of creative industries research.

To study creative industries, then, is to study a hybrid assemblage of industry and policy phenomena which is under constant pressure for development and adaptation to economic, political and technological conditions and forces, many of which lie outside their control. And the nature of policy discourse – as one of us has argued some time ago (Cunningham 1992)—is that it is not 'ideas rich', but 'ideas thick': 'Policy discourse can appear dry, boring and opaque to the [academic] critic because it is a ritualised, procedural, highly repetitious form of public discourse and is the expression of firm hierarchies of authority which define its intelligibility' (p. 35). Its purpose is typically to represent and manage incommensurate logics and ideals just as it is usually the outcome of contending stakeholders. As an 'assemblage', it is not the outcome of independent, systematic thought. It is strategic, 'contingent articulations among myriad heterogeneous elements' ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assemblage\\_theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assemblage_theory)).

Consider, again, the original definition: 'those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of IP'. This definition is managing the relationship between old and new media, art and commerce, traditional individualist notions of creativity and industrialized collective

endeavours based on IP ‘generation and exploitation’. Very succinctly, in the phrase ‘wealth and job creation’, it attempts to manage the notorious gap in the creative industries between the wildly successful few and the many getting by or struggling – what Richard Caves (2000) called the ‘A list/B list’ phenomenon. This management of the incommensurate makes policy discourse dynamic but unstable. It is open to critique that ‘The creative industries don’t exist – at least not as a unified category’ (Davies and Sigthorsson, 2013, p. 1). **But that also means it can be nimble, modular and adaptive to different political and policy conditions.**

Another practical consequence of adopting this position is that research agendas can be generated around distinct policy domains that engage the different disciplinary knowledges that underpin research in the creative industries, as well as allowing the blurring and convergence of policy domains to come into prominence. This means that the development of research agendas can at the same time lead to strategies for scholars’ engagement and impact.

*Cultural policy* is clearly the central domain impacted by creative industries. Creative industries are often treated as an outlier in *industry policy* and the battles over the neglect of the creative sector in STEM-centric *innovation policies* must be continually engaged (see Cunningham 2014). It is significant that several definitions of creative industries (and a whole monograph, see Stoneman 2011) focus on innovation. For Kimpeler and Georgieff (2008), creative industries ‘comprise of particularly innovative lines of businesses .... They play a special role as creative input providers in the innovation system’ (p. 209). And for Müller *et al.* (2008, p. 3) they ‘are not only—by definition—a source of creativity, but they also show a strong performance in technological innovation and thus directly contribute to the level of industrial innovation in the economy in terms of technologically new products, new processes and results of their own R&D efforts’.

There is a strong argument that *urban policy and planning* play a more decisive role in how creative industries actually impact day-to-day life than policies that national governments typically produce (see chapter 4). Grassroots activist Marcus Westbury (2015) has argued that municipal bureaucracy plays a more dramatic role in encouraging or inhibiting urban creative scenes than much national cultural policy. Some of the debates with greatest depth and international engagement are played out around the role of the creative sector in the amenity of cities (Florida 2002, 2017), its contribution to gentrification and affordability (Oakley and Ward 2018), and whether creative industries are an intrinsically inner-urban phenomenon, or can thrive in suburban, peri-urban, or rural environments (Flew 2012; Markusen 2014).

The matter of *intellectual property policy* recalls the original DCMS definition of creative industries, which placed the ‘generation and exploitation’ of IP at its core. Most definitions of creative industries, implicitly or explicitly, reinforce its centrality. For sociologists Lash and Urry (1993), for example, each of the creative industries has an ‘irreducible core’ concerned with ‘the exchange of finance for rights in intellectual property’ (p. 117). It is important to differentiate amongst the four types of intellectual property: patents, designs, trademarks and copyright. Each of the first three requires ‘opting-in’; that is, the creator must apply for or register their piece of intellectual property. Only copyright is regarded as inhering in the act of creation, and it is the form of intellectual property which generates most debate in creative industries. The centrality of IP ‘generation and exploitation’ in the creative industries might have been more straightforwardly obvious 20 years ago, but widespread and accelerating digitisation has meant that, while IP generation proceeds apace, the question of its exploitation has become more complicated.

All this means that a policy-oriented and policy-relevant agenda must be prepared to understand government’s needs and rationales for intervention. The creative economy is diverse, mixing sectors

of rapid growth, stability and relative and absolute decline; of private, public and community activity; and of globally exposed versus domestically embedded and hyperlocal sectors. That isn't a case for exceptionalism – most sectors exhibit such lumpiness – but it is a case for flexibility, modularity and adaptiveness.

Policies supporting arts and culture rest largely on grounds of market failure and positive externalities. For the commercial creative industries, the rationale for support can be various. Large commercial creative industries (print and broadcast media) require regulation but also new forms of intervention to offset the loss of public interest journalism and local content as global platforms come to dominate digital news dissemination and expensive scripted drama production.

At the other end of the scale, the creative sector is mostly composed of small and micro businesses which need specific visibility separate from Big Business and Big (Public) Culture. And innovation often comes from the margins. Creative small businesses need facilitated access to innovation schemes (R&D tax credits, export market intelligence and access, networking opportunities). A sophisticated innovation framework would also maximise the complementarity of the publicly-funded cultural institutions and commercial creative industries.

Looking forward, the role of creative skills in the evolution of our future economy needs to become mainstream knowledge.

## 2. The 'triple bottom line'. Economic, cultural and social approaches to the CCIs: separate or convergent?

Research agendas are undergirded by the need to develop rigour around the economic, the cultural and the social dimensions. Each has potentially different research methods and certainly different criteria of value. But this is not only an issue for the CCIs – we should be wary of exceptionalism which is often just lazy or narrow policy thinking.

The case that has been made for the creative industries in policy debates has most frequently been an economic one. There is a clear reason for this: before the COVID pandemic, demographic and economic statistics point to the creative economy as one of the fastest growing industry sectors in the world, creating more jobs at lower cost than any other sector (UNCTAD 2018; Newbigin 2019, 23). Aggregate data has been generated that demonstrates the significant – and in many cases growing – contribution made by the creative industries to national economies, as demonstrated through metrics such as share of Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross Value Added (GVA), employment, and trade.

As the Australian cultural economist David Throsby (2010) has observed, this has been part of a broader reshaping of debates internationally around the scope and purposes of cultural policy. As indicated in UNESCO reports from the 1970s and early 1980s, cultural policy was at one time conceived of largely in terms of the contribution of the creative and performing arts to society and culture, and how this may be enhanced or improved. By contrast, and in parallel with a broadening of the definition of culture to include the products of commercial cultural industries (Girard 1982; Garnham 1987), the case for cultural policy is increasingly couched in terms of its contribution to the creative economy, and the wider impact of the creative industries on other sectors of the economy (for example, Venturelli 2005; UNCTAD 2010).

Throsby identified the logic behind this as essentially pragmatic, in helping to 'legitimise culture in the eyes of hard-headed economic policy-makers', and where 'cultural policy ... can be rescued from its primordial past and catapulted to the forefront of the modern forward-looking policy agenda, an essential component in any respectable economic policy-maker's development strategy' (Throsby 2010, p. 7).

The story that the data tells is generally a positive one. In the UK, where there is the longest history of data collection, the creative industries as originally defined constituted 5.3% of GVA in 2016, and are as high as 14.2% of GVA if other digital sectors, gambling, sport and tourism are included (DCMS 2017). A recent study in Australia found that the creative and cultural sectors account for 6.4% of the nation's GVA (BCAR 2018), and in China it has been found that the cultural and creative industries accounted for 4.1% of the nation's GDP in 2017. UNCTAD (2019) has found that trade in creative goods has more than doubled between 2002-2015, and that creative services now account for 18.9% of all trade in services, with the latter expected to grow significantly.

But the conflation of arts and culture with the creative industries, under the general rubric of all sectors being engaged with creativity as an economic input and outputs being cultural in the anthropological sense of products that communicate symbolic meaning, comes at some cost. Rationales for public support for the creative and performing arts, for instance, have historically been based on arguments around their intrinsic *cultural value*, and the propensity for an undersupply of such valued cultural goods and services in the absence of public subsidy.

By contrast, public support for the creative industries has tended to be more akin to industry policy as applied to emerging sectors such as advanced manufacturing, in that it aims to promote innovation and enhance *economic value*, as measured by sales, employment and exports. In other words, the policy rationales for supporting the games industry or cutting-edge digital special effects and post-production are unlikely to be the same as those for supporting a regional dance company, a local artists' co-op or a chamber orchestra.

The UK's DCMS originally combined these sectors on the basis of their common claims to generate copyrightable forms of intellectual property through the application of creativity. But this focus on copyright presents its own difficulties in the context of the growing digital economy. The revenues of the giant digital platform companies, for example, are derived not from copyright, but from the capacity to amass data from user interactions with cultural products which they explicitly do *not* own or control, which can then be on-sold to commercial advertisers. And creative industries forming around these platforms operate with very different business, cultural and audience logics.

The challenges of addressing differing registers of value have been recognised by, among others, the cultural analyst John Holden (2009) and the Warwick Commission (2015) in its Report on the Future of Cultural Value. Holden proposed three registers of value that constitute a triangle:

- 1) **Intrinsic value:** the value that individuals and societies attach to cultural forms and practice in and of themselves, which is highly subjective and difficult to quantify;
- 2) **Instrumental value:** the value attached to cultural forms and practices in terms of their direct and tangible economic and social benefits, which is measurable, but should not be measured through purely economic metrics;
- 3) **Institutional value:** the value that cultural organisations contribute to – or subtract from - in their contribution to the public realm and the provision of public goods. This may include their contribution to public knowledge, social trust, a fair and equitable society, enabling civil society, addressing regional disparities, and other such measures of the public good. Holden suggests that this may be measurable through social impact metrics or what he terms Social Returns on Investment (Holden 2009, p. 454).

The Warwick Commission proposed that cultural and creative industries needed to be understood as an ecosystem where the connections between publicly funded culture, commercial culture, and non-market forms of cultural provision arise at the intersection of three forms of value:

- 1) **Economic value**, or the contribution to GVA, employment, exports, and 'spillover' or 'multiplier' effects;
- 2) **Cultural value**, or the role played in enriching the lives of citizens and communities, through enabling equitable access to cultural forms of the highest levels of artistic quality;
- 3) **Social value**, or the role in enabling participation in culture and realising creative capacities across all sections of the population, particularly under-represented communities and groups.

This 'triple bottom line' draws upon the concept of integrating social, environmental and economic value that has developed in corporate social responsibility debates. But it has faced challenges in recent academic debates that seek to uncouple economic and cultural value. Banks (2018) has argued that 'creative growth' is not an appropriate cultural policy goal in light of inequalities arising from the distribution of social capital, the adverse environmental consequences of capitalist

economic growth, and the capacity to constrain cultural imaginaries through a one-dimensional focus upon profits and growth.

A forward research agenda for creative industries should not advocate economic growth *per se* as an end in itself. Following Piketty (2011), there is an intense global conversation about the distributional dimensions of capitalist growth, and the adverse political, social and economic consequences of rising inequalities (*cf.* Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). The continuing – and perhaps growing – barriers to effective participation in the creative industries based upon class, gender, race and disability speak to the limits of ‘business as usual’, as do movements such as #metoo, Black Lives Matter, #communicationsowhite and others that are challenging the domination of these industries by white, middle-class males and the effects this has on equitable engagement with the arts, media and culture (Campbell *et al.* 2018; Saha 2018; Chakravartty *et al.* 2018).

The quality of creative work is also a growing matter of concern, and the extent to which the logic of the ‘gig economy’ and workplace precarity is embedded in many fields of creative industries employment. There are also well-documented and longstanding limitations of conventional measures of economic activity such as GDP and GVA (Coyle 2015; Quiggin 2014), and these problems are reflected in the difficulties in capturing the value and significance of voluntary and non-market activities in cultural and creative industries statistics. On the other hand, as we will see, there is now a recognised capacity of creative industries, in the face of widespread concern about automation and the future of work, to generate jobs at rates often much higher than the general economy – jobs that even the critics agree can be meaningful and satisfying ‘good work’ (Banks 2018).

The multiplication of expectation seen in the triple bottom line is not unique to the creative industries. The higher education sector, for example, is now viewed in terms of its contribution to economic outcomes such as research and development, exports through the enrolment of international students, and its role in local and regional economies, as well as social value metrics such as equitable participation and inclusion of under-represented groups. These are goals that sit alongside its historic missions of advanced education and the creation of new knowledge. The field of stakeholder analysis (Flew and Lim 2019) points to the extent to which the performance of institutions – and particularly those where there is a public interest in their activities – is assessed across multiple criteria, and these tendencies are increasing rather than diminishing. In light of the growing crisis of trust in liberal democracies, corporations in sectors as diverse as banking and finance, mining, energy, and the digital economy are increasingly expected to demonstrate their ‘social licence to operate’ (Hall and Jeanneret 2015).

The triple bottom line will continue to shape the relationship of creative industries to policy going forward. Society’s growing expectations for this the CCIs are a welcome source of relevance. One of the challenges of the creative industries is that they have tended not to collectively organise, meaning that the politics of cultural policy continue to be shaped disproportionately by the major arts and cultural organisations and arts funding bodies. At the same time, the ‘participative turn’ in cultural policy (Bonet and Negrier 2018) make a return to an arts-centred, producer-focused cultural policy increasingly less likely, as the demands of the public as consumers, audiences, voters and creators of content – particularly in online, digital spaces – are challenging supply-side framing of policy across a range of domains.

However, we must contemplate modifications and challenges to this fundamental given in cultural policy in any forward research agenda. An adherence to the triple bottom line – good for corporate responsibility publicity – can mask a lack of rigour in accounting for separate spheres of the economic, the social and the cultural. Rigorous, policy-relevant economic and statistical research

over time, together with advocacy that speaks with one voice, underpinned the recognition in the UK of the creative industries as a legitimate industry sector.

In a major break with past practice, UNCTAD's (2018) study, *Creative Economy Outlook & Country Profile Report*, suggests: 'In the creative economy policy space, it makes sense to separate the usually integrated 'cultural' and 'creative' policy. Currently many countries combine them. However, they serve two separate but related objectives, one commercial, and one cultural. As the creative-digital enmeshment expands, it will become increasingly difficult to avoid the separation of the two' (p. 18).

The trends that lie behind this shift in UNCTAD's approach to mapping the global creative economy include the fact that creative services, especially design, are the drivers of creative industries growth, rather than cultural production. UNCTAD has recognised trends such as: the creative economy and the digital economy are increasingly intermeshed; small-scale audiovisual content (for example, on the global digital platforms such as YouTube, Tik Tok, Instagram and their Chinese equivalents) is booming; China is rapidly advancing in all areas; and the future of work agenda places imperatives for creative thinking in education.

Bakhshi and Cunningham (2016) earlier posed the question of whether cultural policy and creative industries policies should be uncoupled, which would allow for a clearer assessment of the cultural goals underpinning support for publicly-supported forms of arts and culture, and a clearer focus on the industrial policy goals and instruments underpinning support for sectors such as software, advertising, fashion and design.

What is needed, they argued, are official statistics which allow both cultural and creative activity to be taken full account of, acknowledging both the substantial overlap between the two areas of activity, as well as dealing as best as possible with the well-known challenges that underestimate the extent of cultural activity (for example, the extent of 'non-market output of market producers' and voluntary activity, which was captured in the Australian Bureau of Statistics' Satellite Account of Cultural and Creative Activity (ABS 2014)). It would also help to clarify that the cultural sector is supported by government mainly on cultural grounds, and that the creative industries are supported primarily because of their economic contribution. Both cultural and economic wellbeing are, they argued, of equal importance to government.

However, the development of such a research base for the economic case for the creative industries is very uneven globally. Few jurisdictions outside the UK have an established history of grappling with the definitional, policy and ultimately political issues raised by the creative industries as an economic category. Given twenty years of intensive policy-focused research in that jurisdiction, perhaps only in the UK can the case be made to distinguish clearly between the economic case for the creative industries and their cultural and social remit. The 'home' for creative industries remains, in most jurisdictions, cultural policy. But research can contribute to avoiding this being seen as a case of a Hobson's choice. More rigorous methods, such as those adopted by Geoffrey Crossick and Patrycja Kaszynska (2016) and The Warwick Commission (2015) for more forensic research into social and cultural value (Crossick and Patrycja Kaszynska identify accrual of benefit to the 'reflective individual', to civic agency and engagement, community vitality, arts-based learning in formal education, the value of volunteerism) are equally important.

Addressing the future of the triple bottom line is also becoming more important as the different economic dynamics of the cultural and the creative industries appear to be diverging more strongly. In a statistical analysis of the 2016 Australian Census of Population and Housing (DMRC 2018) creative employment in the creative economy is shown as growing at nearly twice the rate of the overall workforce. But when cultural production (including film, television and radio, music and

performing arts, publishing and visual arts) and creative services (including advertising and marketing, architecture and design, and software and digital content) are separated out, three quarters of jobs in the creative industries are in creative services, with the balance located in cultural production. Employment in the creative services sector is growing on average nearly three times the rate of the overall workforce, and incomes in all sectors of the creative services sector are higher than the Australian average. The coherence of the creative industries as a sector is at issue.

There is a broader policy field that opens up when economic dynamism and jobs growth in the digital creative services industries is articulated to the future of work debate. This debate focuses on relative demand for skills and occupations, and new skills and occupations, into the near and medium term future in the face of the impact of automation and the wider ramifications of the so-called 'fourth industrial revolution'. There is strong emerging evidence for the proposition that creative skills have a higher degree of resistance to automation (Future Skills 2030; Bakhshi *et al.* 2017). Articulating the economic dynamism and jobs growth in the digital creative services industries to the future of work debate allows an exploratory sharpening of the distinction between the economic and the cultural while narrowing the gap between the economic and social. Particularly for younger people and the digitally literate, the social crisis of finding work that is both sustainable and meaningful is addressable through a focus on high-growth digital creative services industries. In this agenda, the cultural is able to return to a focus on what Holden calls intrinsic value.

### Triple bottom line: Transversal research that values social and cultural as well as economic dimensions

While the disciplines of economics and the social sciences have followed different trajectories in their consideration of the benefits of the creative economy, with economic approaches drawing on techniques honed in environmental economics and social science methods building on qualitative methods, there is increasing consensus on the importance of thinking across disciplinary boundaries to observe the 'non-economic' benefits of the creative and cultural industries (eg. O'Brien, 2014; Pratt, 2020). The plethora of methods and competing ideologies have led to some confusion. Examples of work aiming to create some clarity in the field include Dave O'Brien's (2010) consultancy for the UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport assessing eight different economic and social science approaches to valuing culture, and Allan, Grimes, and Kerr's (2013) report for the Ministry for Culture and Heritage that describes how the total economic value in a cultural context encompasses several sources of value in addition to monetary value, including non-use value, option value and instrumental values / externalities.

*Understanding the value of arts & culture*, The Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) Cultural Value Project led by Geoffrey Crossick & Patrycja Kaszynska (2016) (2016) and the Warwick Commission's Future of Cultural Value (2013) provide wide ranging, policy-oriented, approaches to recognise, measure and grow both economic and non-economic benefits.

In Australia, there have been a number of attempts to apply a range of valuation methods to measuring the 'non-economic benefits' of culture. Examples include Franco Papandrea's (1999) application of contingent valuation methods to assess willingness to pay for the mandatory transmission of Australian television programs, and choice modelling by Choi, Ritchie, Papandrea, and Bennett (2010) to value different attributes of the services offered by Old Parliament House. As part of its Screen Currency project, Screen Australia commissioned Olsberg SPI (2016) to identify the intrinsic, instrumental and institutional values of Australian screen culture, as defined by John Holden (Holden, 2004, 2006, 2009). An example of cross-disciplinary work is Turnbull and McCutcheon's

(2017) application of the total economic framework developed by Allan, Grimes, and Kerr, identifying the non-economic benefits of television crime drama using descriptive qualitative methods.

#### Specific examples: Cultural indicators and social impact of the arts

Consistent with the fact that the economic structure of the CCIs is distinctive due to its unique social drivers for participation, the value of creative and cultural endeavour is never solely economic. Cultural goods and services, by which we mean goods and services that have publicly recognised cultural value, realise important social and cultural benefits. While the benefits of culture and creativity for society, such as promoting social inclusion, civic participation, and community wellbeing, are intangible, they are thoroughly researchable. Globally there is a dynamic and advanced literature on measuring the benefits via qualitative and quantitative methods.

While such approaches are important for assessing the efficacy of supported cultural programs and making resource decisions, they also play an important policy role in focusing attention on the broad public purposes of cultural policy and programs.

At its twenty-sixth session in 1991, the General Conference of UNESCO resolved to 'establish an independent World Commission on Culture and Development', in order to place the topic of culture on the table of development policies in the post-Cold War period. The commission's final report, *Our Creative Diversity*, released in 1995, contained many recommendations, but central amongst these was the recommendation that UNESCO research and publish what were described as 'quantitative cultural indicators' so that national governments might measure the relationship between culture and various aspects of development. This new international top down push for cultural indicators from the mid-1990s was synchronous not only with the rise of Creative Industries policy research, especially in Australia and the UK, but also the efforts of cultural studies researchers, notably in Australia, to construct a distinct field, cultural policy studies, at the interface of the humanities and social sciences.

Since that time, *cultural indicators* and *social impact of the arts* research have become ubiquitous in the field. Modelled on the use of social and economic indicators by government agencies, the notion of 'cultural indicators' is currently used to refer to both mid-level policy concepts that organise specific domains of government partnered research, such as 'cultural participation', 'sense of belonging', 'vibrancy' and 'civic culture', as well as individual instruments, such as survey questions and scales, that can be used to operationalise such concepts at the level of data collection. For instance, the Indicator Framework on Culture and Democracy developed by the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, in partnership with the European Commission, offers a framework for top-level European measures of culture and democracy that can highlight opportunities for policy intervention. (<https://culturalindicators.org/#>). This framework collates available statistics on cultural access, participation, funding, in conjunction with data on democratic participation in order to generate national profiles.

Cultural indicators research has also developed at the level of tools for assessing the benefit of individual programs, so called 'social impact of the arts' reviews at local government and community level. A key concept in many studies is the highly cited notion of 'social capital' that has developed in both normative (eg Putnam) and critical (eg Bourdieu) traditions of social research, and has been applied variously to measure community levels of trust, social connection and networks, public voice and media visibility, access to decision making processes through community and business associations, employment opportunities and education, and so on. The application of such concepts to understand improvements in community wellbeing and inclusion are often related to specific instances of community disadvantage, as in the case of resettled refugee communities, young people

from low socio-economic backgrounds, or regions recovering from natural disasters or economic disruption. They can also be used to assess links between culture and social wellbeing at a population level.

### 3. General Global Overview of CCI Research

An important feature of academic work on creative industries is the extent to which it sits across a divide between the social sciences and the humanities. In their bibliometric analysis of academic journal articles on creative industries over the 1997-2012 period, and citation paths deriving from the most influential publications, Cho *et al.* (2016) observed that the largest number of the 1002 published papers on creative industries over this period have been in Business and Management (28.6%) and Geography (27.6%). Other important fields have been Environmental Sciences (14.9%), Urban Studies (14.1%) and Sociology (11.7%). Perhaps surprisingly, given the degree to which debates in these fields have been taken as defining the parameters of the creative industries academic literature more generally, the humanities-related fields of Communication (9.0%) and Cultural Studies (8.5%) have been in the minority in terms of the overall number of academic papers published. The largest number of papers have been published in the United States (24.5%), followed by the United Kingdom (18.2%) and Australia (11.0%). Other significant groupings of authors in the field in the English-language literature have come from Canada (8.2%), The Netherlands (5.6%), Germany (5.2%), Sweden (4.7%) and Asian countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea (4.6%).

In their analysis, Cho *et al.* identified five recurring clusters of issues that have arisen in the creative industries academic literature:

- 1) *The impact of information and communication technologies (ICTs) on the creative industries.* The rise of the creative industries has long been linked to the growing economic and cultural impact of the internet and digital media technologies (Howkins 2001; Mitchell *et al.*, 2003; Hartley 2005; Flew 2012a; Bakhshi *et al.* 2013), although in practice policy debates about digital media and creative industries have often gone along parallel but different paths (Bakhshi *et al.* 2013; Flew 2018a), and there have been those who have dispute the association of creative industries with ICTs as an exercise in opportunistic statistical inflation (Garnham 2005). But there is little doubt that ICTs have radically transformed all aspects of production, distribution and consumption in traditional media industries across the spectrum of film, publishing, broadcasting, music and performance, as well as generating new convergent media sectors and powerful new players (for example Netflix and YouTube in broadcasting and film, Spotify in music, the impact of Google and Facebook on news and journalism), and transforming the relationship of media industry workers to the sector and to digital platforms. Not surprisingly, this has generated a great deal of academic work, of which some strongly articulates these developments to the creative industries.
- 2) *Globalization and the creative industries.* This is part of a wider literature on both the globalization of culture (Cowen 2002; Yudice 2003; Pieterse 2015) and the ways in which a new international division of cultural labour (Miller *et al.* 2011; Flew 2013, 2018b) are reorganising cultural production and consumption on a global scale (*cf.* Cunningham *et al.* 2008; Pratt 2008). A distinctive question within this general literature is that of whether globalization grows the creative economy by promoting cultural trade, large-scale migration, and a movement up the value chain of consumption preferences towards cultural goods and services as necessities are increasingly affordable to larger segments of the global population. The latter has been particularly strongly promoted by UNCTAD (2010; *cf.* Venturelli 2005; Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008), who have identified creative economy strategies as an alternative developmental pathway for low-to-middle income countries that brings together indigenous cultural products and global and digital distribution networks (Flew 2013, p. 142-49). Whether globalization promotes new economic opportunities for local creative industries, or simply reinforces the threat of cultural domination and 'information imperialism' (Schiller 1991; Tremblay 2011), has become an important field of scholarly debate.

- 3) *The distinctive nature of work and enterprise development in the creative industries.* The large number of creative industries workers who work outside of standard employment contracts, or who establish their own small businesses, has led to considerable research into whether – for better or worse – they exemplify emergent employment models of post-industrial capitalism. It has also triggered research into the role played by networking and contingent, project-based work and employment in the creative industries, and the extent to which this may impact upon patterns of inequality, particularly in cities that are major creative hubs (for example McRobbie 2016; Saha 2018).
- 4) *Cities and regions as incubators of creative work and the creative industries.* Early creative industries literature focused strongly upon the pull of the urban environment in enabling cluster development and promoting the ‘soft infrastructures’ that was essential to build successful interpersonal networks (Landry 2000). There was also the extensive literature on the role played by urban cultural infrastructure as an attractor for a geographically footloose ‘creative class’ (Florida 2002). There was a notable backlash to the creative cities/creative class discourse as it became apparent that it could be associated with rising urban inequalities (Peck 2005; Kotkin 2006; Grodach and Loukaitou-Sideris 2007). More recently, there has been greater attention given to suburban, peri-urban, rural and regional locations as places that lend themselves to creative work and the clustering of artists and creative professionals (Flew 2012b; Breitbart 2013; Harvey *et al.* 2012; Daniel 2015). Even Richard Florida, the guru of ‘creative cities’, has recently performed a partial *mea culpa*, conceding that his own work on the impact of the creative class on cities greatly underestimated the capacity for their arrival to herald greater urban inequalities and social division (Florida 2017).
- 5) *National and regional differences in the evolution of creative industries policies.* Creative industries policies have been critiqued as pursuing a generic, ‘cookie cutter’ approach based on particular policy templates and urban planning ‘scripts’ (Oakley 2004; Pratt 2008). What has become apparent is that the most successful policy strategies in this regard are those that are adaptive to local institutions, histories and cultural circumstances (Cunningham 2009; UNESCO 2013; Lee and Lim 2014; Keane 2016). Chapter 9 returns to these debates about comparative creative industries policies, and the limits of a predominantly UK-centric approach to understanding the policy field.

In identifying the gaps in this literature, Cho *et. al.* (2016) make particular reference to three points. First, they note that it is a predominantly European and North American literature, with some Australian influence, and that voices from other parts of the world had not been significant over this period. Their focus is particularly on the Asian region, where they note that governments have been inclined to develop creative industries strategies, particularly with regards to developing global cities, but what has often been adopted have been ‘cookie cutter’ versions of policy ‘templates’ developed elsewhere (Pratt 2008), with the attendant problems of adaptiveness to local circumstances. As creative industries and creative economy strategies are now flourishing in regions such as Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and Africa, this point about the local and the global can be extended more widely.

There also remains a bias in the literature towards cities, and particularly global, cosmopolitan cities, and that the work on how other geographical locations, such as regions, small towns and suburbs, can develop creative industries strategies is suggestive but incomplete. Finally, they observe that ‘the economic impact from micro and fragmentary creative activities still cannot be effectively uncovered. We cannot ignore these economic contributions. Methods to estimate the value of these contributions are greatly in need.’ (Cho *et. al.* 2016, p. 16). The literature is rich in small-scale case studies, but how to scale these up to broader, credible economic impact analyses remains a challenge, and that ‘more policy-oriented studies are needed to help policy makers in designing

strategies for advancing CCI, especially for countries in the early stage of CCI development' (Cho *et. al.* 2016, p. 17).

#### 4. Outside the big cities: Rural CCIs and opportunities for innovation

While much creative industries research is to be found in business and management literature, there is a particular flourishing of work within geography and urban studies, which together constitute 41.7 per cent of the outputs identified by Cho et al (2016) in their meta-review of creative industries literature.

A good deal of debate about the creative economy has centred on the network effects of talent location in large and cosmopolitan cities, implying by choice of location, or claiming explicitly, that significant cultural and creative activity is an urban phenomenon of first tier cities (eg. Hall 1998) and cultural amenity in inner city areas is a primary driver of location decisions for the ‘creative class’ (eg. Florida 2002). The role of creative activity in regional areas, however, has not been so clear, with Cho et al. (2016, 40-1) concluding that there is a ‘need to do further studies on more remote or regional places in order to infer how remote places influence [cultural and creative industries]’ and to ‘understand how cultural background, industrial structure, the level of regional development, and opportunities all effect creative workers and vice versa’.

The Australian literature documents the importance of the creative industries for economic development and social cohesion in regional Australia. Foundational studies based in sociology and cultural geography focused on single sites—including Waitt and Gibson’s (2009) ground-breaking work on the importance of conceptualising the creative economy in place. This expanding literature has started to focus on neighbouring regions and landscapes with commonalities, including on the role of the creative industries in the development of remote far northern Australia (Daniel, 2014, 2016; Daniel, Fleischmann, & Welters, 2016) and the creative systems at play in the Hunter region north of Sydney (McIntyre, Kerrigan, King, & Williams, 2020), and an emerging body of literature on how music and other festivals galvanise communities, supporting social adhesion and creative economy development (Derrett, 2009; Edwards, 2012; Gibson & Connell, 2012, 2015; Gibson & Gordon, 2018; Luckman, Gibson, Willoughby-Smith, & Brennan-Horley, 2008; Ward & O’Regan, 2014).

Building on this work, Cunningham and McCutcheon and others, in partnership with the cultural funding agencies of the five mainland states, undertook a Australian Research Council Linkage project, *Australian cultural and creative activity: A population and hotspot analysis* (2018-2020), the first comparative analysis of multiple regional hotspots of creative activity across Australia.<sup>1</sup>

Fieldwork for the project was conducted during 2019, before anyone had imagined how a pandemic was about to devastate the creative industries. Findings from the project reveal the benefits that creative and cultural activities that accrue to participants and the community as a whole—and that they are particularly valuable for rural Australia:

**The coherence of the creative and cultural industries is seen more clearly in non-metropolitan areas.** Fieldwork interviews conducted for the project reveal the interconnectedness of parts of the creative economy. The creative industries concept encompassing everything from arts and crafts through broadcast media and web design to architecture and software development has been criticised as incoherent, put together to bolster expedient economic claims to its size and growth rates, and thereby diminishing the contribution of arts and culture. However, our study of regional,

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<sup>1</sup> Research reports on each of the hotspots included in the study and additional creative economy data resources are available on the project website: <https://research.qut.edu.au/creativehotspots/>

rural and remote communities and economies makes it easier to see clearly the interdependencies between the commercial creative services and arts and culture:

- *There is not the extent of silo-isation and division of labour as in more complex creative ecosystems in metros.* Both organisations and practitioners need to work across sectors, acquiring the skills and building the relationships needed to get jobs done.
- *Creatives have to be more entrepreneurial.* Public funding of the arts is thinner away from the major capital centres, and institutions and practitioners are all actively engaged in promoting their cultural assets to generate income.
- *Prominent brokers act as intermediaries, making connections and encouraging interactions.* Regional areas lack the usual kinds of large commercial and public sector organisations that act as creative industries market organisers. Instead we see local government, universities, local organisations and individuals stepping into the role.
- Portfolio careers stand out in the regions, with constrained opportunities and changing circumstances forcing practitioners to be highly responsive. Portfolio creative careers are the norm in regional Australia, as creative professionals respond to economic challenges as well as changes in consumer and audience preferences.
- *The cultural significance of commercial broadcasting and print is more obvious and its impact of its loss more marked.* Regional news services provide their communities with an ‘essential service’, one that has become increasingly vulnerable as digital disruption erodes the business models of local news and information services. Socially and geographically-relevant local journalism matters to people, connecting them at a social level, providing a sense of place and community, and linking them to local services and businesses (Hess & Waller, 2020). They are also important cultural market organisers in themselves, supporting local advertising and screen production.
- *Commercial creative services and cultural production intertwine, across the spectrum from arts to digital services.* The boundaries blur in service delivery in the regions, as practitioners balance passion projects with revenue generation. For example, there are deep interrelationships between different modes of screen production in the regions, with international film attraction, local production, news production and commercial corporate screen production occurring synergistically as screen producers work to build commercially and creatively sustainable businesses. In the regions, corporate work is not a stepping stone to a career in feature film or television drama, but a way of balancing financial reality with pursuing a passion project (Kerrigan, Ryan, McIntyre, Cunningham, & McCutcheon, 2020). The role of local culture in tourism, the industry often commercially dominant in regions, is another example.

**The creative and cultural industries support health and wellbeing, including during times of community stress.** The creative and cultural industries can be a coalescing and healing force within regional communities, providing training for youth, opportunities for business development and community connection and pathways for improving health and wellbeing.

**The creative and cultural industries not only tell us stories about ourselves, they keep them and nurture them for future generations.** Rural regions may be home to some of a country’s most significant historical sites and museums, the archives of history. These can become significant economic as well as social and cultural assets in tourism and location-based screen production.

**There is a symbiotic relationship between the creative and cultural industries and public infrastructure.** Cultural infrastructure coalesces with other forms of infrastructure in rural areas to deliver economic, social and cultural benefit.


## 5. Creative activity as a ‘vocation’ and measurable cultural activity

While creative activity is fundamental to the CCIs, it has a complex and dynamic relationship to employment. While the CCIs are acknowledged as major drivers of employment, certain sectors, such as the visual arts, are distinct for their reliance on so called ‘Day Jobs’, other household income, and government support. Self-employment is routinely combined with other forms of employment in a complex portfolio of activity. The premise of the ‘work preference model’, developed by cultural economist David Throsby, is that the economic question faced by creatives is the balance between pecuniary and non-pecuniary activity, with arts economists finding the former is often reduced in order to support the latter (Throsby 1994). For Pierre Bourdieu, the economics of the cultural field are unique in so far as they generate non-financial forms of stored value in the form of recognition (symbolic capital), networks (social capital) and skills (cultural capital) that can themselves be converted, under certain conditions, into financial returns (market sales, employment, and state funding). This vision of a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between financial and social forms of value has been central to accounts of innovation economics, and would appear fundamental to the complexity of the socio-economic drivers of the CCIs.

A key problem for research and policy, however, concerns the relationship of creative work to employment. Bernard Lahire has progressed research on creative occupations by considering their variable relationship to formal employment. In his empirical study of the French publishing industry, Lahire found that not only did most authors derive their income outside literary activity, but the temporality of publishing meant authors’ professional presence was highly intermittent (Lahire 2010). Given second jobs are the norm for Authors, as for many creative fields, Lahire suggests authorship should in fact be considered a secondary field of work identities that are analytically separate to participation in the formal labour market. While the social and economic basis of this occupation can be aligned – as in the case of the Author who can live entirely off their writing practice – this group is a minority whose circumstances are unique, and do not explain the economic supports of most author’s careers. Noting that the case of Authors is exemplary for many arts professions, Scott Brook has drawn on Lahire to propose the concept of a *field of creative vocations* as an analytic tool that might empirically quantify the variable relationships between social and labour market forms of work identity, as well as the relationships of *paid*, *partly paid* and *unpaid* creative work.

Figure 1 shows the conceptual relationship between a field of creative vocations and the labour market. *The field of creative vocations* is defined not in terms of employment in a creative occupation or industry, but rather on a socially recognised work identity, one that is based on creative work (activity) regardless of whether this work is financially remunerated. It therefore includes those who are fully and partly remunerated for their creative work through the sale of creative goods and services, as well as those who are not. The Labour market is the field of all remunerated employment, including self-employment, in which all those with a creative vocation engage. The subfield of ‘creative professionals’ crosses both fields, as it represents all those whose creative vocation is identical to their position in the labour market; ie their creative work is remunerated by creative employment. Although analytically separate, the proximity of positions and the sub-spaces they create is highly variable for any individual; for some they are one-and-the-same position (the successful artist), for others they are *at times* identical (the moment of the project’s realisation, a publication, a performance, a period of funding), and for others they are perennially distant (those with supporting day jobs). The premise of the model is that for most creative activity, multiple job holding and a diversity of forms of income are the norm.

Figure 1. *The field of creative professionals.*



### Example: a quantitative description of the field of creative vocations

This conceptual model can be operationalised in Cultural Participation surveys that capture cultural and creative activity as well as employment data for individuals across a range of creative activities. In this section, we report preliminary findings from a current study as an example of how this model can be used to analyse the distribution of formal and informal work in the creative field, including the relationships between those who are paid, partly paid and unpaid according to a range of demographic variables. The *Participation in Selected Cultural Activities Survey* administered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has over many iterations sought to capture the extent of informal cultural activity through a number of measures related to received payment and income for a range of cultural activities. The list of designated ‘cultural activities’ is fairly comprehensive, and includes website, software and computer games development, film-making, editing and photography, the performing arts (inc. comedy), visual arts and craft, fashion, interior and graphic design, music composition and mixing, and writing. Unlike the broad range of activities that professional cultural workers are engaged in, the list consists of *content-generating practices* that can be undertaken in informal and non-organisational contexts. It hence contains an ‘auteurist’ bias that, although present in the academic conception of cultural work and self-representation of creatives, is not a comprehensive account of all the activities associated with cultural employment. For example, the survey does not clearly identify digital forms of creation and distribution, hence excluding the potentially much larger population of creative workers engaged in social media entertainment.

The most recent iteration of the survey was in 2017/2018 and sampled 28,243 Australians aged 15 and above. Table 1 shows the distribution of paid and unpaid participation in creative and cultural activities across major occupational groupings for all those engaged in a creative and cultural activity. The table shows that although professionals account for a very high level of both paid (44%) and unpaid (19%) cultural activity (consistent with media and arts, design and ICT occupations being in this grouping), they are not the only major occupational grouping to do so. A significant amount of income generating activity was recorded for almost all occupational groupings, including a significantly high engagement for those who were unemployed and/or not in the labour force (16%) with this group accounting for the largest share of unpaid creative and cultural activity. Furthermore, within the major grouping ‘Professionals’, Media and Arts and Design professionals account for around 44% of those professionals who receive an income from cultural work, with those employed

in Education (19%), ICT (18%), and Business and Marketing (13%) professions also engaged in significant amounts of income-generating cultural activity.

Table 1. The distribution of paid creative activity work by occupation in current main job or business (column percentages)

Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO) Major Grouping (2006)	Cultural activity status		
	Received income	No received income	Total
Professionals	44%	19%	22%
Managers	7%	7%	7%
Technicians and Trades Workers	8%	6%	6%
Clerical and Administrative Workers	7%	9%	9%
Community and Personal Service Workers	6%	8%	7%
Sales Workers	4%	6%	6%
Labourers	2%	4%	4%
Machinery Operators and Drivers	2%	2%	2%
Unemployed / Not in Labour Force	16%	38%	36%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Total (N)	(N=586)	(N=5527)	(N=6113)

Source: *Participation in Selected Cultural Activities, 2017-18*. ABS Labour Force Survey. Cf 'Whether received any income from selected activities'. Data extracted from ABS TableBuilder.

To further explore the field of creative vocations, we conducted a Multiple Correspondence Analysis of the same dataset (See Figures 2, 3 and 4). In order to explore the association between different demographic variables, such as age, gender, education and creative practices, and different modes of engaging in creative activity (formally employed, occasionally paid, unpaid), we constructed a subpopulation of 'creative vocations' on the basis of an individual being a member of at least one of four groups:

- 1) those employed in **Cultural Production occupations** (visual and performing arts, publishing and media industries);
- 2) those employed in **Creative Service occupations** (advertising, design, marketing, and software);
- 3) those who are not employed in either Cultural Production or Creative Service occupations, but who received payment for their engagement in a creative activity ('**Creative practitioners**'); and
- 4) those who are not employed in either Cultural Production or Creative Service occupations, and who did not receive payment for their engagement in a creative activity ('**Creative volunteers**').

Figure 2 shows the first two dimensions of the MCA that account for just under 63% of the inertia. (See appendix for details of the procedure). All variables shown in the figure were treated as active – ie contributing to the distribution – with the exception of 'status in employment' (*employee; owner/manager of (un)incorporated business with(out) employees; contributing family worker*).

In Figure 2 the horizontal axis appears structured by labour force participation, education level, and age. On the left side are located variables for Creative Services and Cultural Production employment, full-time employment, wages and salary, self-employment (enterprises), possession of a university degree, and the age group 25 to 55. By contrast, variables for Superannuation, pensions and no

income, age groups 55+, education levels of grade 12 or less are located on the right hand side. The Vertical axis appears structured by age, study, employment, and participation in music and drama.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of all survey respondents according to the two dimensions shown in Figure 2. We can identify three groups based on an interpretation of the distribution of variable shown in Figure 2. The first ellipsoid on the left shows a sub-field of remunerated creative activity in both formal creative employment (cultural producer and creative service employees) and non-creative employment (creative practitioners) whose predominant practices are design, photography and writing. The second ellipsoid on the right shows a subfield of unremunerated creative activity (volunteers) consisting of retirees and whose predominant practice is craft. The third ellipsoid shows a subfield of students and the unemployed who do not receive remuneration for their practice and who are younger and whose distinguishing practices are the performing arts.

These ellipsoids are interpretations of statistical tendencies in the descriptive data, and they do not represent exclusive groups or clusters; rather, they describe the set of variables that are most distinctive according to the distribution.

Figure 4 contains a separate plot of the distribution of each of the four sub-populations of creative vocations according to the dimensions in Figure 2. While as expected we see a cloud of individuals around each of the variable points shown in Figure 2, Figure 4 shows the different levels of dispersion for these populations. As expected, we see a strong clustering of Creative services employees in the top right quadrant, while, as we might expect from Table 1, we see a very large dispersion of unpaid creative activity right across the space. Interestingly, Cultural Producers and even more so Creative Practitioners, are more widely dispersed across the two dimensions, reaching into the spaces of retirees and students.

As this example shows, the field of creative vocations is a comprehensive method for analysing the demographic diversity of creative work, and engages different agendas within policy and research.

Figure 2. Coordinate plot of active and passive variables in MCA




Figure 3. Cloud of individuals with notes on distributions





Figure 4. Cloud of individuals for each sub-group of Creative Vocations



## Appendix

*Active variables for MCA in Figures 2, 3 and 4.*

**Personal income source:** Wages or salary; profit or loss from own unincorporated business; profit or loss from own rental investment property; any government pension or allowance; superannuation, annuity or private pension; any other regular source; not stated; no income source.

**Employment Status:** Full-time; Part-time; Unemployed; Not in Labour Force

**Highest level of Educational Attainment:** Degree; Diploma; Certificate; Yr 12 or below

**Study:** Full-time; Part-time; Not in Study

**Cultural vocation:** Creative Service Occupation; Cultural Production Occupation; Creative Practitioner; Creative Volunteer

**Field of Study in Highest qualification:** Creative Arts; Not Creative Arts

**Sex:** Male/Female

**Age:** 15-24; 25-55; 55+

**Creative Participation type:** Performed in drama, comedy or musical; singing or playing music; dance; writing song lyrics or mixed or composed music; writing fiction/nonfiction; visual art; craft; photography, filmkaing or editing; designing websites, software or computer games; fashion, interior or graphic design; did not participate in listed activity.

*Supplementary variable and modes (passive)*

**Status in employment:** Employee; owner/manager of incorporated business with employees; owner/manager of incorporated business without employees; owner/manager of unincorporated business with employees; owner/manager of unincorporated business without employees; contributing family worker.

Multiple correspondence analysis

Method: Burt table/adjusted inertias

Number of observations = 2,546

Total inertia = .02797542

Number of axes = 2

	Principle inertia	Percent	Cumulative percent
Dimension 1	0.0143584	51.33	51.33
Dimension 2	0.0032364	11.57	62.89

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